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and Intelligence System, Albany, New York. The author received his doctorate in criminology
from the University of California, Berkeley, and served as an assistant to Prof. Kirk during his graduate studies. His previous contribution to this Journal, "The Use of Statistics in Criminalistics"
appeared in Vol. 55.-EDTrroR.
One of the controversial aspects of applied probability is its explicit use in legal proceedings in
order to assess the significance of various types of
evidence. The ubiquitousness of probability in
legal proceedings has long been recognized, but
little has been done to clarify the precise role and
usage of mathematical probability in our courts.1
One of Rabelais' characters, Judge Bridlegoose,
solved the problems quite simply by allowing each
of the parties to a civil suit to roll a pair of dice
after the evidence had been collected and allowed
to ripen for a suitable period of time.
"And when you have done that," said Bluster
[to Bridlegoose], "how do you set about handing
down a decision?"
"Just like you other gentlemen," replied
Bridlegoose, "I give the decision to the one who
wins the throw, in accordance with the judicial,
tribunary, praetorian, first-come-first-served
2
dice."
Although this may not be the ideal way to
apply the concepts of probability in court, it must
be realized that probability, and consequently
probability theory does have a place in court. It is
difficult to imagine that any reasonable assessment
of circumstantial evidence can be made without
the elementary principles of probability theory
being used, whether this use is made explicit or
not. Generally the basic probabilistic ideas remain unexpressed, and serve only as mental
pathways guiding the jurors' thought processes to
their conclusions. But every so often these ideas
are made explicit and are cast into mathematical
terms.
When this occurs, it is essential that the manipulation and interpretation of these mathematical
1For a general discussion of this, see: BAix, V. C.,
"The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and
Standards of Proof", VANDERBILT LAw REviEw
14 (1961) 807-830.
2 PUTNAM, SAm Lu (transl. & ed.), THE PoRTABE
RABELAIs, The Viking Press, New York, 1946, p. 495.

terms be correct. Unfortunately, in many reported
instances where probability figures have been expressed in criminal trials, or discussed in connection with such proceedings, gross errors have been
made. Some of these errors are exemplified in a
newspaper report of a recent criminal case which
was afforded considerable attention in the national press under such titles as, "Probability Law
in Court," and "Law of Probability Foils 2
Robbers In Tough Case." The remainder of this
article will be devoted to a discussion of some of
the errors in the application of probability theory
that are exemplified in the newspaper report.
Part of the newspaper item which reported some
of the proceedings of the trial read as follows.
The questions and answers went something
like this:
Q. What is the probability of a man hay- (1)
ing a mustache?
A. One in three.
Q. What is the probability of a young (2)
woman having blonde hair?
A. One in four.
Q. What is the probability of seeing a (3)
yellow car on a Los Angeles county-or
even California-street?
A. One in ten.
Q. What is the probability of a man (4)
having a beard?
A. One in ten.
Q. What is the probability of a Cauca- (5)
sian woman being seen with a Negro man?
A. One in a thousand.
Q? Then-what probability is there that (6)
you will find, at a given time and spot, a
Negro male with a beard and a mustache
driving a yellow car in which a blonde
woman with a pony tail is riding?
A. Multiplying the probabilities of the
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six factors together, the chance would be
one in 12 million.
That, plus other circumstantial evidence, was
enough for the jurors. They returned a guilty
verdict ..."
Aside from the omission of the sixth item-the
probability that a woman has a pony tail, which
must be one in ten to arrive at the figure of one
in 12 million-it is difficult to know how close the
above report is to the actual testimony during the
trial. However, since the type of report quoted
represents the kind of information that the public
is given, the following discussion will be presented
on the basis of the quoted questions and answers.
PROBABILITY

Since the questions all begin with, "What is the
probability of..

.,"

or, "...

what probability is

there...," it seems reasonable to ask just what
this means. Although several definitions of probability might be given4 , the most applicable to
the situation in this case would seem to be that
which is first presented in most elementary textbooks on probability, namely, the frequency
concept. If we are considering a population of n
objects, m of which have some property, say A,
then p = m/n is the probability of selecting an
object with property A if the selection is a random
one from the n objects. 5 (A random selection is
defined as one where each of the n objects has an
equal chance of being selected.)
The value of p is quite often estimated from a
sample of the n objects. If the random sample
size is s, and if there are r objects with property
A in the sample, then r/s is a reasonable estimate
of p. When such an estimate is made, it must be
realized that we are dealing with a variable quantity that has certain statistical properties of its
own, although these will not be considered in this
article.
It is dear that in order to express a probability
as defined above, it is necessary to relate it to some
particular population. Although the general population being considered for the probability estimates in the example is not made explicit, it is
presumably the entire adult or near adult population of persons either in California or in Los
Angeles county. At times only a subpopulation
4For example, see: GooD, I. J.,"Kinds of Probability",
ScIENcE, 129 (1959) 443-447.
5
This definition will be adhered to in connection
with the basic figures, but will be generalized for
further derivations.
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may be considered, such as the entire adult, male
population of an area. This is equivalent in many
respects to the use of conditional probability, and
should be handled accordingly.
In the third question, the population being considered is not at all dear. Does it consist of people
who "see" cars, or of automobiles, or perhaps of
people who own or drive cars. Similar problems
about the population arise in connection with the
fifth question. In order to relate the final calculations to the same general population, the probabilities involved in the third and fifth questions
will be considered to apply to the general population in the third question (i.e., the probability
that a randomly selected person owns or drives a
yellow car), and to the Negro male subpopulation
in the fifth question (i.e., the probability that a
randomly selected Negro male would "be seen"
with a Caucasian female).
It will be convenient to use some notation to
represent the exact probability that is being used.
The symbol Pr(A) will be used (instead of p) to
represent the probability of A occurring (i.e., that
a randomly selected member of the population has
property A) with respect to the entire population
of the area, and Pr(A I B) will be used to represent
the probability of A occurring with respect to that
portion of the population possessing property B.
The symbol AB will mean the occurrence of both
A and B.
STATISTICAL DEPENDENCE

The first error to be discussed is that of ignoring
the existence of any statistical dependence that
might exist among the various properties of
interest. Consider the first question: "What is the
probability of a man having a mustache?" If A
represents the event of having a mustache, and B
is the event of being a man, the desired probability
is Pr(A I B). This is estimated as 1/3 according to
the quoted answer. Now consider the fourth question: "What is the probability of a man having a
beard?" If we let C be the event of having a beard,
the probability is, in notation form, Pr(C I B),
which is estimated as 1/10. Suppose we now ask:
What is the probability that a man has a mustache
and a beard? In notation form, this is Pr(AC I B).
Using the reasoning represented in the news item,
the answer would be Pr(A B) X Pr(C IB),
which is 1/30.
Suppose a person has been selected from the
population at random (any population that the
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reader is familiar with), and you are told that the
person is a man. Using your own experience as a
guide, estimate the probability that the person has
a mustache (i.e., Pr(A I B)). Now suppose that
another person is selected at random, and you are
told that this person is a man and that he also has
a beard. What is your estimate now of the probability that the person has a mustache (i.e.,
Pr(A I BC))? The two estimates will probably not
be the same; if not, it indicates that having a beard
and having a mustache are not independent events.
Under general conditions, it is easily shown that
Pr(ACj B) = Pr(A I BC) X Pr(CIB), which is
true regardless of any dependence between A and
C. Now if Pr(A IB) is not the same as Pr(A I BC),
the calculation of Pr(AC I B) in the previous paragraph must be in error. Individual probabilities
over the same population can be multiplied
together only if they are independent.
Other questions that might be asked about the
properties considered in the example are: Do
blondes tend to wear pony tails more than brunettes, redheads, etc.? Is the probability of a Negro
driving or owning a yellow car greater than that
of a Caucasian driving or owning one? Is the
probability of a person with a beard and mustache
driving or owning a yellow car greater than is the
case with the general population? Would a blonde
Caucasian girl be more likely to go with a Negro
male than would a Caucasian girl with some other
hair color?
What do you do when the answer to these or
similar questions is yes? Aside from mathematical
manipulation for dependent probabilities, perhaps
the easiest thing to do is to consider the dependent
properties together. For instance, instead of asking
about a man having a beard and then about a man
having a mustache, ask about the chance of a man
having both a beard and mustache, and estimate
this as a single probability figure. If too many
items are interdependent, this may not be practical, and mathematical methods will have to be
used. For example, suppose the probability of a
bearded man having a mustache is 9/10; then
Pr(A I BC) = 9/10. Using the estimate of 1/10
for Pr(C I B), and using the formula Pr(AC I B) =
Pr(A BC) X Pr(C I B), we find that Pr(AC I B)
= 1/10 X 9/10 = 9/100.
PROBABILITIES oF DuPLICATIoN AND EROP,

The last question in the news item essentially
asks about the probability of the combined occur-

rence of all the mentioned properties in a single
random selection from some population or subpopulation, which is not clearly defined. The
phrase ". ..at a given time and spot. .. ," is essentially irrelevant to the problem, and, in addition, involves properties beyond those already
considered. If the time and place are those related
to the crime, the probability requested is one, provided the information that the witnesses have
given is correct. If they are not related to the
crime, their consideration seems immaterial. The
main probability which is of immediate interest is
that for the occurrence of the logical product of all
listed events in a single random selection from the
population. Call this probability Pr(T). However,
this still does not present the situation in a form
that is readily usable, and the second error to be
noted is the use of Pr(T) as a guide to the conclusion that the evidence and facts do or do not
warrant a guilty verdict, or whatever verdict may
be at issue.
The situation that exists is somewhat as follows.
The investigating agency had information about
certain properties that the guilty couple would
possess. An intensive, non-random search was
made, which was concluded when a couple possessing these properties was found. The important
considerations now are how likely it is that: first,
another couple with these same properties exists in
the population, and second, the related probability
that the conclusion the couple are guilty would be
in error. If the probability that another couple
with the same properties exists is high, could anyone be certain "beyond a reasonable doubt" that
the couple on trial are the guilty couple, even if
Pr(T) is very small? A probability related to that
of duplication is the probability of error, Pr(Er),
which is defined as the probability that a guilty
verdict would be in error (based solely of course on
the evidence used to derive the probability), and
this figure offers a fairly dear basis to guide the
decision making process.
A derivation of Pr(Er) was made in a previous
article6 , where it was shown that the probability
of error could be related to Pr(T) by one of two
formulas, depending upon the actual model used,
namely, Pr(Er) - X/4 or X/2, where X = Pr(T) X
i, it being the total size of the population, and provided that X is less than one. This latter provision
6
KINGSTON, C. R., "Applications of Probability
Theory in Criminalistics", J. AM. STAT. Asso., 60
(1965) 70-80.
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will certainly be true if the evidence has any significance at all. Although the actual derivation was
made with reference to a particular kind of physical evidence, its extension to the type of evidence
considered in the present case is not unreasonable.
PROBABILITY OF CHANCE OCCURRENCE

Now that the probability of chance occurrence
of the properties, Pr(T), has been shown to be a
necessary intermediary to a usable figure, its derivation from the information given in the news item
will be examined next. We want to find the probability that a randomly chosen member of the total
population will have certain properties associated
with him or her. In order to do this, it will be
necessary to adjust the probabilities so that they
refer to the same population. The third error,
which is more of a confusion factor rather than an
actual error, is the combination of probabilities
that are based upon different populations or subpopulations without taking this into account and
without clarifying the final reference population.
So even though it may be permissable to multiply
the individual probabilities which are independent
in the news item together, the interpretation of the
resulting probability is not dear.
A sample calculation of Pr(T) will be made
without trying to assess the individual probabilities
accurately. For convenience in presentation, letter
symbols will be assigned to each of the properties;
these are listed in Table 1.
For simplicity, certain assumptions will be made:
(1) That no dependencies which may exist between
the properties, except for A and C, would significantly change the results if they were taken into
account in the calculations; (2) that the male member of the couple was the owner or provider of the
TABLE 1
Symbol

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K

Property

having a mustache
being male
having a beard
being female
being a Negro
having blonde hair
wearing a pony tail
owning or driving a yellow car
being a Caucasian
associating with a Negro male
associating with a Caucasian female

yellow car; (3) that the adult or near adult population of Los Angeles county is the population
being considered. Also, some probabilities not
mentioned in the news item will have to be estimated. It will be assumed for purposes of the
subsequent calculations that Pr(B) = Pr(D) =
1/2, Pr(E) = 14/100, and Pr(I) = 75/100.
Properties J and K will need some attention to
adjust them to the other properties and subpopulations considered. The figure of 1 in 1000 in the
answer to the fifth question is not clearly related
to any subpopulation, as previously noted. Since
this article is concerned with the manipulation and
interpretation of such figures, rather than the correctness of the individual estimates, 1/1000 will be
taken as an estimate of the ratio of Negro males
who associate with Caucasian females, where the
association is something more than just casual.
Thus Pr(K I BE) = 1/1000. Assuming a ratio of
about 1:5 for Negro males to Caucasian females
in the population, and keeping in mind the definition of probability given earlier, we have Pr(J I DI)
= 1/5000.
With the simplifying assumptions, there will
essentially be two possibilities for a random selection of one person from the population to have all
properties of interest. One is for the person to be
the male half of a couple possessing all properties
(call this event Q), and the other is for the person
to be the female half (call this event R). Since
these are mutually exclusive events, the sinm of
their individual probabilities will equal Pr(T).
We will now need the probabilities of ABCEH
and DFGI. Pr(ABCEH) = Pr(AC) X Pr(BEH)
= 9/100 x (1/2 X 14/100 X 1/10) = 63/105.
The factorization was made to emphasize the
handling of the dependency between A and C in
connection with the other properties. Pr(DFGI) =
1/2 X 1/4 X 1/10 X 75/100 = 75/(8 X 103).
Since dependencies other than those already specified or included in the estimates are being ignored,
we have Pr(KIBE) = Pr(KIABCEH) and
Pr(J I DI) = Pr(J I DFGI). However, the additional properties in the other direction cannot be
tossed in so casually. Let J' be the property of
associating with a Negro male who also has properties A, C, and H, and let K' be the property of
associating with a Caucasion female who also has
properties F and G. A simple calculation shows
that Pr(K'I ABCEH) = 9/101 and Pr(J' DFGI)
= 1/(2 x 10.
Using the general formula for conditional proba-

I
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bilities, we have Pr(Q) = Pr(K'I ABCEH) X
=
Pr(ABCEH)
= 5.67/101, and Pr(R)
Pr(J' DFGI) X Pr(DFGI) = 1/(2 X 105). Thus
Pr(T) = Pr(Q) + Pr(R) = 5.26/108, which is the
calculated probability of a chance occurrence of T
in a single random selection from the population.
As it happened, the more extensive breakdown of
the properties involved in the calculations, which
tended to decrease the value of Pr(T), was balanced by the consideration of dependencies and
other factors which tended to increase the value of
Pr(T). Consequently, the result arrived at in the
news item, 8.34/108 (another way of writing 1 in
12 million), is about the same as that calculated
here, 5.26/108. Therefore, the most significant
error is not in the actual value of Pr(T) obtained,
but rather in the use of Pr(T) instead of Pr(Er) in
trying to convey the significance of the evidence
to the jury.
THE FiNAL PROBABiT~rY

OF ERROR

We now have the basic information to compute
Pr(Er). Estimating the population of interest to
be about two million, we have X = Pr(T) X i =
.1051. Using the formula for Pr(Er) favoring the
accused, Pr(Er) = X/2 = .0526. This is interpreted to mean that, in the long run, about 5 percent of the conclusions of guilt, which are based
on evidence giving rise to approximately the same
value of Pr(Er), can be expected to be in error.
The effect of using Pr(T), and saying, "The
chance of this evidence occurring is one in twelve
million," should carefully be compared to the
effect of using Pr(Er), and saying, "The chance of
error in convicting these people on the basis of this
evidence is about one in twenty." Although both
statements are technically proper, the former omits
some of the facts and conditions that are vital to
the evaluation of the figure given, and is therefore
misleading.
It is again emphasized that the figures are not
presented as accurate or even approximate evaluations of the actual probabilities involved in the
case under discussion. They only apply to the data
presented in the newspaper report, plus the assumptions and additional probability estimates
that were necessary. Further, the probability of
one in twenty would apply only to the descriptive
evidence; it is stated in the news item that there
was other circumstantial evidence to be considered.
This additional evidence would, provided it was
incriminating, reduce the probability of error

beyond that which might be calculated for the
descriptive evidence alone.
SoMs OTHER PROBLEMS

There are a few additional factors that should
be mentioned in connection with such applications
of probability theory.
Even though the analysis given above is internally consistent, the resulting figures are only
as good as the raw figures fed into the mathematical machinery. The estimates of the individual
probabilities must be reasonably accurate to expect
valid results from the calculations. There is no
indication of how the estimates quoted were derived, and consequently no complaint can be
registered against them. Such estimates should be
based on an actual sample of reasonable size if
they are going to be explicitly presented in court.
The other alternative, which is far too common
in the legal-probabilistic setting, is to make a
"conservative guess". That is, to select a probability of chance occurrence that is dearly much
higher than the true one, using the justification
that the final calculation will then be higher than
it should, thus underemphasizing its importance.
If such conservative guesses are indeed conservative, this is a perfectly good procedure, as long as
the limitations are not forgotten. It would be
instructive to perform some simple experiments to
determine the relationships between the figures
arrived at by the two alternative procedures.
Another factor that cannot be lost sight of is the
probability that the witnesses are in error. This
affects the final result by adding a possibility that
the guilty persons do not possess all of the properties that form the description. In the above analysis, the probability that the guilty persons do
possess all of the properties is assumed to be one.
The mathematical treatment of the same situation
when this probability is not one has not yet been
theoretically derived in a form suitable for direct
application.
Another factor to be considered is the probability that the guilty couple are no longer in the
area being searched. The probability of error can
be no smaller than the probability of the couple
not being in the population of size i. One way of
minimizing this probability is to consider the entire
population of the world. If the evidence has a low
enough probability of chance occurrence, this can
be a useful procedure, but if minimal amounts of
evidence are being worked with, a balance must be
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made between the probability of error and the
probability that the guilty persons are in a particular population or area.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

It is hoped that the above discussion of the
Collins case will create an awareness of the value,
as well as the pitfalls, of an explicit probabilistic
approach to the evaluation of evidence in those
persons-judges, attorneys, witnesses (both lay
and expert), jurors, etc.-who may have a directing
force, or indeed any interest, in our system of
justice. The applicability of the evidence to the
case at hand can be determined far more accurately by making the varous steps in the evaluation
explicit and analyzing them with valid logical procedures. We have seen how an impressively small
probability figure takes on an entirely different
significance when evaluated with respect to its true
logical content.
The three major errors that were discussed are:
1. Failure to consider all possible statistical
dependencies that may exist between individually
estimated probability figures.
2. Using a probability of a chance occurrence of
a set of properties as a guide to the significance of
evidence rather than a probability related to the
duplication of the set of properties in the population.
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3. Combining probabilities formulated over different populations or subpopulations, and not
clarifying the final population or the interpretation
of the results.
It will only be by recognizing the above, and
similar, errors and problems that the explicit application of probability theory in legal matters will
attain its proper recognition and its full potential.
NOTE: After completing this article, this author
had the opportunity of discussing the relevant
aspects of the case with the defending attorney. It
seems that the presentation of the situation is
somewhat dearer in the TIM magazine write-up
(January 8, 1965, page 42). The questions and
answers quoted earlier in this article were apparently not involved in the expert's testimony,
but were rather hypothetical questions composed
by the newspaper reporter on the basis of the
prosecutor's summary to the jury. It appears that
the expert testified only as to the manipulation of
independent probabilities, such as in dice throwing
situations, and bad no opportunity to testify about
the factors relative to the particular case or to be
subjected to cross-examination on these issues. It
also appears that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence other than that which the probability
calculations were based upon to seriously question
the assertion that these probability calculations
played the dominant role.

